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America (Praeger Press/ABC-Clio, 2009). 
 
a  his EAP marks the start of our 21th year. 
We begin with philosopher Dylan Trigg’s 
review of the Merleau-Ponty Circle’s 
“Flesh and Space: Intertwining Merleau-
Ponty and Architecture” conference held at Missis-
sippi State University’s School of Architecture in 
September. As Trigg’s comments indicate, many of 
the papers probed architectural and environmental 
implications of Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on 
d body and environmental intercorporeality. 
Next, architect Alvin Holm asks how we might 
engage more fully with the places in which we find 
ourselves, and educator John Cameron, in the 
fourth letter from his rural home on Tasmania’s 
Bruny Island, describes the difficulties and satisfac-
tions of practicing a lived environmental sustain-
ability. Cameron’s essay is accompanied by four 
woodcuts of Bruny Island birds by h
t Vicki King (see image, right). 
Next, philosopher Bruce Janz examines the 
concept of landscape, which he considers in terms 
of provenance and subjectivity. He provides six 
questions that he hopes might bridge the division 
between phenomenological and historical/cultural 
understandings of the landscape concept. Last, we 
reprint a section from anthropologist Phil Staf-
ford’s recent Elderburbia: Aging with a Sense of
Place in 
EAP  Preserved Digitally 
Thanks to the generous assistance of Kansas State 
University Libraries and Research Exchange Coor-
dinator Marty Courtois, all issues of EAP are per-
manently archived digitally. Called K-Rex, this ar-
chive is “open access” and freely available on the 
web. Each issue of EAP has a unique and permanent 
URL that should survive technological, institutional, 
nd staffing shifts. K-Rex’s collection of EAP issues
is available at: www.krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/1522. 
 
Place & Placelessness Reprinted 
First published in 1976 and still widely referenced, 
geographer Edward Relph’s groundbreaking Place 
and Placelessness has become a classic of the phe-
nomenological approach to the study of place and 
has influenced at least three generations of scholars. 
For this reprint by Pion Press (the original London 
f
publisher), Relph has written a new introduction 





Below: Artist Vicki King’s woodcut of a Tasmanian masked 
owl; see her images accompanying John Cameron’s “Fourth
Letter from Far South—- p. 14. 
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Items of Interest 
The 2010 symposium of the Forum for Architec-
ture, Culture, and Spirituality (ACS) will take 
place June 17-19 at the Abbey at St. John’s Univer-
sity in Collegeville, Minnesota. Go to: 
http://faculty.arch.utah.edu/acs/symposium2010/ind
ex.htm. 
Spacings of Technologies is the theme of the sixth 
annual conference of the International Association 
for the Study of Environment, Space, and Place, 
(IASESP) to be held April 30-May 2, 2010, at the 
Burkshire Center at Towson University in Towson, 
Maryland. www.towson.edu/iasesp 
Bodily Phenomenology is a conference to be held 
May 19-21, 2010, at the Centre for Studies in Prac-
tical Knowledge at Södertörn University in Stock-
holm, Sweden. A major focus is to encourage “con-
nections between philosophical and empirical tradi-
tions” in regard to phenomenological research on 
the lived body: “How can we do a phenomenology 
that is not only a phenomenology of the body… but 
is a phenomenology bodily informed?” Contact: 
martin.gunnarson@sh.se. 
 
Home Cultures is an interdisciplinary journal pub-
lished three times a year since 1994. It is dedicated 
to “the critical understanding of the domestic sphere 
across time frames and cultures.” The editors invite 
submissions from design practice, design history, 
architecture, anthropology, sociology, archaeology, 
urban planning, contemporary art, geography, psy-
chology, folklore, cultural studies, literary studies 
and art history. www.bergpublishers.com/BergJournals/. 
 
The new academic journal, Interiors: Design, Ar-
chitecture, Culture, begins publication in 2010 and 
welcomes contributions that consider the spaces and 
places within built structures. The aim is to “bring 
together the best critical work on the analysis of all 
types of spaces. Whether homes, offices, shopping 
malls, schools, hospitals, churches and restaurants, 
interiors are all embedded with meaning, both con-
sciously and subconsciously, and evince particular 
multi-sensory and psychological responses.” Go to: 
www.bergjournals.com/interiors.  
Largely through the efforts of philosopher Lester 
Embree, the Interdisciplinary Coalition of North 
American Phenomenologists was recently organ-
ized as a means to support multi-disciplinary work 
in phenomenology. The group’s first conference was 
held last May, at Ramapo College in Mahwah, New 
Jersey. The editorial committee for that conference 
represented Architecture, Communicology, Philoso-
phy, Political Science, Psychology, Sociology, Ge-
ography, and Women’s Studies. Committee mem-
bers included: Robert Bernasconi, Scott Churchill, 
Christine Daigle, Lester Embree, Hwa Yol Jung, 
Richard Lanigan, Frank Macke, Daniel Marcelle, 
James Mensch, George Psathas, Mary Rogers, 
David Seamon, Dennis Skocz, and Fred Wertz. 
Contact: embree@fau.edu. 
 
The workshop, Phenomenology and the Vulner-
able Body: the Experience of Illness, will be held 
May 6-7, 2010, at the University of Hull, UK. An 
interdisciplinary panel of speakers considers the ex-
perience of bodily vulnerability and implications for 
the understanding of embodiment and selfhood. 
“The resources of phenomenology will be put into 
conversation with accounts of the lived experiences 
of those living with illness, pain or other kinds of 





The 7th International Conference on Design & 
Emotion will be held October 4-7, 2010, at the In-
stitute of Design, Illinois Institute of Technology, 
Chicago. Held every other year, the conference in-
volves practitioners, researchers, and industry lead-
ers who meet and exchange knowledge and insights 
concerning the cross-disciplinary field of design and 
emotion. “Since this conference was first estab-
lished in 1999, what many predicted then came to 
be. Technologies are now able to achieve emotional 
qualities and design examples using these technolo-
gies abound. While we have made significant pro-
gress in research and practice relevant to emotional 
factors in design, many fundamental questions re-
main unanswered and new issues have been raised 
as we experience major changes in technological, 
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social, cultural, and economic environments. We 
are at the stage for another leap forward in the de-
velopment of new understanding and vision of emo-
tional factors in design through our critical reflec-
tion, innovative exploration and collaborative en-
deavor.” www.id.iit.edu/de2010/ 
The annual meeting of Existential and Phenome-
nological Theory and Culture (EPTC) will be 
held May 31-June 3, 2010, at Montreal’s Concordia 
University in Montreal, Quebec, in conjunction with 
the Congress of the Social Sciences and Humanities 
of Canada. Contact: eptc2010@gmail.com.  
 
A conference on Scale, sponsored by the Architec-
tural Humanities Research Association 
(AHRA—see EAP, winter 2009), will be held No-
vember 19-20, 2010, at the University of Kent, Can-
terbury, UK. Questions to be considered include: 
“In a post-humanist age, do we associate good scale 
relationships with particular places and times in his-
tory? Do body metaphors still have resonance? 
Should humans be the ultimate scaling device gov-
erning the design of artifacts from chairs, to interi-
ors, buildings, towns, and landscapes? How do ur-
ban grids and networks affect scale? What is the 
politics of scale?” Contact: scale@kent.ac.uk. 
 
Alexander wins Scully Award 
The 11th annual Vincent Scully Prize was awarded 
to architect Christopher Alexander at the National 
Building Museum in Washington, D.C., November 
5, 2009 The prize recognizes “exemplary practice, 
scholarship, or criticism.” The NBM’s announce-
ment reads as follows: 
For nearly 40 years, Christopher Alexander has challenged the 
architectural establishment, sometimes uncomfortably, to pay 
more attention to the human beings at the center of design. To 
do so he has combined top-flight scientific training, award-
winning architectural research, patient observation and testing 
throughout his building projects, and a radical but profoundly 
influential set of ideas that have extended far beyond the realm 
of architecture. Indeed, at times it seems architects may be the 
last to understand and to apply the benefits of his challenging 
work. 
      In the process Alexander has authored a series of ground-
breaking works, including A Pattern Language and The Time-
less Way of Building. His most recent publication, the four-
volume The Nature of Order incorporates more than thirty 
years of research, study, teaching and building. 
      Alexander became Professor of Architecture at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley in 1963 and taught there continu-
ously for 38 years, becoming Professor Emeritus in 2001. He 
also founded the Center for Environmental Structure, pub-
lished hundreds of papers and several dozen books, and built 
more than 300 buildings around the world. In 2002 he moved 
back to England, where he now lives and works. Alexander is 
widely recognized as the father of the pattern language move-
ment in computer science, which has led to important innova-
tions such as Wiki, and new kinds of object-oriented pro-
gramming. He is the recipient of the first medal for research 
given by the American Institute of Architects, and has been 
honored repeatedly for his buildings in many parts of the 
world. 
      Alexander remains a practicing professional architect and 
a licensed contractor in the state of California. He and his col-
leagues maintain professional offices in Berkeley, which pro-
vide city planning services as well as the design and construc-
tion of buildings. Alexander is also a prolific author and artist. 
His unique combination of professional, scientific, and hands-
on disciplines have been the basis for his evolving understand-
ing of a new scientific and empirical basis for judging, build-
ing, and modifying the quality of the environment. 
 
News from Readers 
For his advocacy of Classicism in design, Philadel-
phia architect Alvin Holm has been given the 1st 
Clem Labine Award, which honors “a consistent 
body of work that fosters humane values in the built 
environment.” Holm received the award at the an-
nual Traditional Building Exhibition and Confer-
ence, held in Baltimore, October 21-24. We thank 
Holm for contributing an essay to this issue of 
EAP—see p. 13. He also sent the following email in 
regard to the spring 2009 issue. 
I have always enjoyed receiving EAP, although I should con-
fess I am often mystified and then sometimes discouraged by 
the turgid wordiness of the typical essay. I chalk this up to my 
own shortcomings and my own unfamiliarity with the lingo of 
phenomenology. Somehow, however, my faith in your work 
persists, along with a sense of the importance of EDRA, etc. 
But I do not speak the language (yet), and that in itself may be 
seen as a critique. Forgive my audacity but isn’t there a way 
these notions can be expressed in less abstruse terminology?  
        Today, however, as I was reading the spring issue, all 
kinds of lights went on and bells rang again and again. First it 
was Shirazi’s excellent evaluation of Pallasmaa’s ideas that I 
read quite happily, agreeing enthusiastically with all his 
points. To dissect the architectural experience into so many 
separate aspects is to risk missing their complex interdepend-
ence and the whole. Getting the pieces back together again 
may become a major chore, if indeed it is possible at all. And 










tive comments made a whole lot of sense to me. 
       Chamberlin’s essay on Heidegger was similarly engross-
ing. After my initial struggles with ideas like “unlearning” and 
words like “originary,” I slipped into synchrony on the second 
page at “To Think and Think Again.” A little later he writes of 
Heidegger’s discussion of the roots of both words as deriving 
from the Old English thanc, a fascinating etymology in itself. 
      To that I would like to add some thoughts from the medie-
val mystic Julian of Norwich that I encountered many, many 
years ago in another context altogether. Julian wrote an essay 
on “Thanking,” wherein she describes the reciprocity of words 
in several languages for both giving and thanking. For exam-
ple, we ask for mercy and when it is granted we say “merci” 
(if we are French). We pray for grace, and when we receive it 
we say “gracias” (if we are Spanish). We receive goodwill (or 
thanc in  Old  English,  or   tong  the  Indo-European root), 
and we say (if we are gracious ourselves) “thanks.” 
      And on it goes, perhaps in other languages as well, giving 
and receiving have been named the same. For me this is an 
exciting revelation of immemorial ideas of transaction, self 
and other, human and divine, earth and heaven. Which way 
does the current flow in a lightning strike? It goes from sky to 
earth as it appears, but also it flows from earth to sky. In 
DNA’s double helix, the directions are both ways as well, and 
Hermes goes from Gods to human beings and back again. 
     How this all speaks to architecture I am not sure. Of Hei-
degger’s four fundamentals—earth, heaven, mortals, and 
gods—the possibilities speak volumes. From my own deeply 
traditional point of view, all modernist thought has gone astray 
in architectural theory, if not in art, commerce, and medicine 
as well. I contend that we think too much in ways no other 
eras did. We sought to rethink several thousand years of West-
ern culture. Instead of learning from the past, we have over-
intellectualized and killed the thing we took apart to study. 
      Look around at what we’ve wrought and weep. Other cul-
tures have made shifts from time to time in some organic way, 
based firmly on whatever came before–until today. As in the 
production of snynthetics, we have grown quite clever in the 
isolation of ingredients. But how well do they nourish us? 
Citations Received 
Christopher Alexander, 2008. Nature Unfolding [in-
terview]. Tricycle, vol. 17, no. 3 (spring). 
 
Katy Butler, the editor of Tricycle, queries Alexander in re-
gard to the spiritual impulse that informs his work. In respond-
ing to her question, “What does it mean to you to make an 
arch that is pleasing to God?” [in reference to the dining-room 
archways in his West Dean visitor center in England], Alex-
ander replies: “Of course, I do not mean to say that God is 
something like an old man with a white beard. It is something 
deep in the universe, the principles that governs all things. To 
do anything right, you need to be in touch with that ‘some-
thing’. To help focus one’s attention on this something, it is 
necessary to find, in your mind, a blankness or emptiness and 
let the solution arise from that emptiness. So, looking at the 
arches, I ask myself, ‘Which of these is closest to my own 
soul? Which is the most fitting gift to God? Which of them 
could best make a person whole?’ The questions clean out my 
mind, get rid of the rubbish, extraneous concepts… and my 
own ego—and so allow me the freedom to pay attention to the 
thing itself.” 
 
Joseph Cambray, 2009. Synchronicity: Nature and 
Psyche in an Interconnected Universe. College Sta-
tion, TX: Texas A & M Press. 
 
This Jungian psychologist examines how psychologist C. G. 
Jung’s concept of synchronicity and acausal connectedness 
has “influenced the current field of complexity theory, which 
works with a paradox similar to Jung’s synchronicity: the im-
portance of symmetry as well as the need to break that sym-
metry for ‘emergence’ to occur.” Cambray develops what he 
calls “cultural synchronicities”—a “reconsideration of histori-
cal events in terms of their synchronistic aspects.” 
 
Farzane Haghighi, 2008. In Search of the Meaning 
of Home through a Phenomenological Study of the 
City of Kerman. PhD dissertation, School of Archi-
tecture, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. 
 
This dissertation draws on concepts from Christian Norberg-
Schulz’s Architecture: Presence, Language, and Place (2000) 
to examine being-in-the city through a comparison and con-
trast of the old and new urban districts of Kerman, a city in 
southern Iran. Key urban elements considered are the baazar 
(market), meridian (square), hesar (walls), and darvaze (gate). 
 
Ned Kaufman, 2009. Place, Race, and Story: Es-
says on the Past and Future of Historic Preserva-
tion  NY: Routledge. 
 
This book examines “how central themes in the American 
experience shape the preservation of heritage—themes of race 
and diversity, progress and tradition, love of place and lust for 
property. Ranging from the 18th-century roots of preservation 
practice to the dilemmas facing New York City today, these 
essays… outline a re-energized, progressive preservation prac-
tice for the 21st century.” 
 
Jeanne Halgren Kilde, 2008. Sacred Power, Sacred 
Space. NY: Oxford Univ. Press. 
 
A survey of church architecture focusing on “the dynamic 
character of Christianity and how church buildings shape and 
influence religion.” Kilde identifies three kinds of power: (1) 
divine power, attributed to God; (2) social power, relating to 
social, particularly clerical hierarchies; and (3) personal 
power—“the various feelings of spiritual empowerment indi-
viduals derived from an experience of the divine.” 
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Braham Boyce Ketcham, 2009. The Alexandrian 
Planning Process: An Alternative to Traditional 
Zoning and Smart Growth. The Urban Lawyer, 
vol. 41, no. 2 (spring), pp. 339-57. 
 
This planner proposes “an alternative to traditional Ameri-
can zoning practices” based on the work of architect Chris-
topher Alexander, who attempts a generative planning proc-
ess favoring small, incremental improvements. Discusses 
“the practicalities and obstacles involved in implementing 
Alexander’s planning process in a real-world setting.” 
 
Lance Klein, 2009. A Phenomenological Interpre-
tation of Biomimcry and its Potential Value for 
Sustainable Design, master’s thesis, Department 
of Architecture, Kansas State University. 
 
“Building upon the claim made by biomimicry scientists 
that a full emulation of nature engages form, ecosystem, and 
process, this thesis uses a phenomenological approach to 
interpret human and environmental wholeness. Phenome-
nology broadens biomimicry’s scientific and technical focus 
on nature and considers how wholeness can be found among 
form, ecosystem, and process; and between people and envi-
ronment. The thesis argues that, without a deeper, more 
responsive connectedness among people, nature, and built 
environment, any proposal for sustainable design will ulti-
mately be incomplete and thus unsuccessful.” 
 
Sharon Kleinman, 2008. Displacing Place: Mo-
bile Communication in the 21st Century. NY: Peter 
Lang. 
 
“Mobile information and communications technologies 
(ICTs) are enabling people to participate in new ways and in 
additional contexts in a broad range of activities…. ‘[H]ere’ 
and ‘there’ can be virtually anywhere, and, moreover, both 
can be moving. Key features of mobile ICTs are their port-
ability and their capacity for enabling people to communi-
cate, seek and share information, and be entertained in ways 
that transcend spatial and temporal constraints.” 
 
Robert Mugerauer, 2008. Heidegger and Home-
coming: The Leitmotif in the Later Writings. To-
ronto: University of Toronto Press. 
 
“Martin Heidegger devoted himself to challenging previ-
ously held ontological notions of what constitutes ‘being’, 
and much of his work focused on how beings interact within 
particular spatial locations. Heidegger frequently used the 
motifs of homelessness and homecoming to express such 
spatial interactions, but despite early and continued recogni-
tion of the importance of homelessness and homecoming, 
this is the first sustained study of these motifs in his later 
works.” Mugerauer’s book is of major significance for the 
 
From Heidegger and Homecoming 
Even before he published anything significant, Heidegger became 
famous because he powerfully addressed how we might live meaning-
fully in the face of the massive destruction and death wrought by 
technological warfare, how we might act authentically when the 
power of the subject is either exaggerated into the cult of egoism or 
annihilated before impersonal systems of power…, and how we might 
hope appropriately in the time of nihilism that rises as traditional be-
liefs, norms, and customs fail. Here too his philosophical work joins 
or is followed by worldwide contemporary attempts to work through 
the loss and recovery of home. 
      Specifically…., Heidegger either directly addresses or clearly im-
plies how we can approach at least the following four major problems 
facing us today: 
 
▪ The existential problems of each individual person—how to live, 
how to face life’s challenges of meaningfulness in our cynical 
postmodern era. 
▪ Massive forced emigration-immigration and refugee displace-
ment around the world, for example, as witnessed in the literature 
and film of exile and diaspora and in the work of international re-
lief organizations. 
▪ Technologies consuming and controlling life itself: genetically 
engineering crops, patenting the agricultural patrimony of mar-
ginalized peoples, developing an international economy market-
ing organs and transplants. 
▪ Ecological disasters on a global scale: the destruction of the 
Earth, the oceans, and the atmosphere—our home of homes. 
 
       [Some] forms of homelessness appear in our separation from the 
natural world. Biotechnologies move beyond sharing the world to 
make it more productive or suited to our desires, to the point where 
they are already consuming and controlling life itself. Many hold that, 
even with reservations about some dimensions of past technologies…, 
we are moving into newly dangerous hubris and alienation from the 
natural biological process of which we are a part…. 
      In addition, environmentally, we are unquestionably destroying 
our home of homes—the Earth itself—as we contribute to climate 
change on a global scale. We are burning fossil fuels in our factories, 
power plants, homes, and cars, releasing so much CO2, that we have 
changed the atmosphere and the oceans…. 
       Though resolving or even mitigating these problems will obvi-
ously not follow directly from what Heidegger says, his complex and 
profound insights into homelessness and the barriers to the possibility 
of homecoming… can help us to learn to think and act appropriately. 
In the end, he does articulate a substantial understanding of how we 
might come into our own. This could occur, however, only as we ac-
tually participate in a specific historical gathering-together of humans, 
Earth, and the sacred, if there is such—an event in which the other 
dimensions would simultaneously come to their own. 
      The first task on the way toward such a homecoming is to become 
open to what gives itself, and for that we need to learn to better think 
and speak about our current homelessness, a task for which Heidegger 











topics covered by EAP, and we hope to review the book in an 
upcoming issue. A section from the book’s introduction is 
reproduced in the sidebar, preceding page. 
 
David E. Nye, 2009. When the Lights Went Out: A 
History of Blackouts in America. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
This historian considers US power outages from 1935 to the 
present “not simply as technical failures but variously as mili-
tary tactic, social disruption, crisis in the networked city, out-
come of political and economic decisions, sudden encounter 
with sublimity, and memories enshrined in photographs. Our 
electrically lit-up life is so natural to us that when the lights go 
off, the darkness seems abnormal.” 
 
Anthony M. Orum & Zacharary P. Neal, 2010. 
Common Ground? Readings and Reflections on 
Public Space. NY: Routledge. 
 
A useful collection of extracts from significant discussions of 
urban open space organized around the three themes of “pub-
lic space as public order,” “public space as power and resis-
tance,” and “public space as art, theatre, and performance.” 
Included are writings by Jane Jacobs, William Whyte, Ray 
Oldenburg, Mike Davis, Sharon Zukin, and Don Mitchell. 
 
Joseph Parry, ed., 2010. Art and Phenomenology. 
NY: Routledge. 
The chapters of this book “explore visual art as a mode of ex-
periencing the world itself, showing how in the words of Mer-
leau-Ponty ‘Painting does not imitate the world, but is a world 
of its own’.” Topics include: Paul Klee and the body in art; 
color and background in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
art; self-consciousness and seventeenth-century painting; 
Vermeer and Heidegger; embodiment in Renaissance art; and 
sculpture, dance and phenomenology. 
Christopher Payne, 2009. Asylum: Inside the Closed 
World of State Mental Hospitals. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
 
This architect and photographer spent six years documenting 
the decay of 70 state mental institutions in 30 states: “Through 
his lens, we see splendid, palatial exteriors (some designed by 
such prominent architects as H. H. Richardson and Samuel 
Sloan) and crumbling interiors—chairs stacked against walls 
with peeling paint in a grand hallway; brightly colored 
toothbrushes still hanging on a rack; stacks of suitcases, never 
packed for the trip home.” 
 
Andrew M. Shanken, 2009. 194X: Architecture, 
Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American 
Home Front. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota 
Press. 
This architectural historian examines “the visionary designs of 
American architecture during World War II” and argues that 
this wartime era was “a crucible for the intermingling of mod-
ernist architecture and consumer culture.” 
 
Sherry Turkle, 2009. Simulation and Its Discon-
tents. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
“Immersed in simulation, we are vulnerable. There are losses 
as well as gains…. There is an anxiety that something is slip-
ping away.” Examines simulation over the last 20 years and 
then provides four in-depth investigations of contemporary 
simulation culture: space exploration, oceanography, biology, 
and architecture. 
 
Mary N. Woods, 2009. Beyond the Architect’s Eye: 
Photographs and the American Built Environment. 
Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
This architectural historian argues that “photography has me-
diated the built environment since the earliest years of the me-
dium.  A photograph was and sometimes still is our first and 
only experience of a building and its surroundings. The eye 
behind the camera becomes ours, gazing on places and struc-
tures.” 
 
Michael E. Zimmerman, 2009. “Globalization, Mul-
ticulturalism, and Architectural Ethics,” in Architec-
ture, Ethics and Globalization, Graham Owen, ed. 
London: Routledge. 
 
This philosopher discusses ethical implications of postmod-
ernist theory. Zimmerman’s real-world example is the di-
lemma for a Western architect “who attempts to adhere to a 
postmodern multicultural moral framework, while being re-
sponsible for designing and helping to oversee construction of 
a major commercial complex in a southeast Asian city.” Her 
clients do not share the Western architect’s concerns “about 
multiple perspectives and marginalized others.” 
Zimmerman writes: “Postmodern theory criticizes West-
ern ethnocentrism, metaphysical foundationalism, centered 
subjectivity, and the idea of progress, on the one hand, and 
celebrates others who have allegedly been dominated and/or 
excluded by the practices and attitudes of Eurocentrism…. 
Unfortunately, such anti-hierarchalism deprives postmodern 
multiculturalists of criteria needed to evaluate critically cul-
tural norms and practices that give every evidence of being 
domineering, repressive, and exclusionary. 
“On the other hand, anti-hierarchalism may provide cer-
tain architects with the justification they need to design for 
anyone [e.g., oppressive political regimes]…. A serious clash 
of cultures can occur when a postmodern multiculturalist at-
tempts to deal with businesspeople in a society whose com-
mitment to modernity is largely limited to globalization de-
fined as planetary economic expansion and integration.” 
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IAEP/EAP Paper Session 
At the annual meeting of the International Associa-
tion for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) in Ar-
lington, Virginia, November 1-2, 2009, EAP spon-
sored a special session on “Phenomenological Re-
considerations of Conventional Environmental and 
Ecological Conceptions and Problems,” organized 
by EAP editor David Seamon and philosopher 
Ingrid Stefanovic. Papers were as follows.  
 
The Saving Power of Fear: Rethinking Griz-
zly Bear Conservation 
 
Leon Chartrand, Visiting Professor, Ethics Theol-
ogy Department, Xavier Univ., Cincinnati; Execu-
tive Director, Jackson Hole Wildlife Foundation. 
 
Grizzly bears fascinate us, and it is this fascination that has 
garnered broad support for their recovery in Yellowstone Na-
tional Park. It is also well known, however, that grizzlies in-
cite fear. I argue in this presentation that it is the current hu-
man desire to repress and conquer fear that may eventually 
realize the grizzly bear’s demise, even as the animal has re-
cently been removed from the U.S. endangered species list. 
This possibility has become evident with the dramatic 
rise of conflicts between people and bears in Yellowstone. No 
longer are bears somewhere out there, foraging in a remote 
corner of the park on some slope far too hostile for human 
settlement. They are instead right here, roaming in backyards, 
spotted from bedroom windows, and foraging in the under-
growth of our minds. 
This situation has raised enough concerns such that bi-
ologists have enacted a management program to address the 
growing number of human-bear conflicts. Upon closer scru-
tiny, however, one realizes that this program is apt to do more 
to bring about the bear’s end than to maintain its recovery 
status because current management programs interpret the 
grizzly as a threat. Fear is understood as negative, and indif-
ferent tranquility is perceived as the positive end. This presen-
tation argues for a reconsideration of fear, interpreting it as a 
mode of preserving and, hence, as a primordial element for 
living viably and for being mindful of our place in nature. 
 
“Social Marketing” and Environmental 
Change: Phenomenological Reflections 
 
Ingrid L. Stefanovic, Director & Professor, Centre 
for Environment, Univ. of Toronto; paper presented 
by Univ. of Toronto doctoral student Luke Gelinas. 
 
There is growing recognition that values drive environmental 
decision making and that there is a need to better understand 
how to modify attitudes to encourage more sustainable behav-
ior patterns. “Community-based social marketing” is increas-
ingly recognized as a legitimate approach to providing prag-
matic tools that encourage behavior change.  
This presentation provides a brief overview of the con-
text and methodologies utilized in such social-marketing tech-
niques. It then moves to analyze these approaches critically, 
looking to phenomenology for more thoughtful directions to 
better understand and shape values and world views. 
 
Pragmatic Phenomenology & Climate 
Change 
 
Edward Relph, Professor and Chair, Department of 
Social Sciences, Univ. of Toronto, Scarborough. 
 
A strength of phenomenology is its ability to elucidate the 
richness of individual environmental experiences. Climate 
change is probably the greatest environmental challenge of the 
present century but is occurring relatively slowly and at a 
global scale. Where is individual experience in this? Can phe-
nomenology elucidate anything about climate change? 
I suggest one can only understand climate change 
through a phenomenological act of imagination that grasps 
experiences of specific weather, such as hurricanes and 
droughts, as opening out into an interrelated unity called cli-
mate; in other words, to grasp a particular weather event as an 
aspect of being. Actions are needed to mitigate the impacts of 
climate changes on economies and on the lives of individuals. 
One of the weaknesses of phenomenology is that it trans-
lates poorly into practical actions. To remedy this weakness, I 
propose a “pragmatic phenomenology,” linking what is 
grasped through experiences of local weather with a sense of 
the boundless unity of climate. I argue that such a pragmatic 
phenomenology may need to be the foundation of any politics 
that promotes the sense of shared responsibility necessary to 
cope with the uncertain effects of climate changes.  
 
Visualizing Scenarios: Theory and Practice 
for Ecological Design 
 
Robert Mugerauer, Professor, & Dean Emeritus, 
College of the Built Environment, Univ. of Wash-
ington, Seattle 
 
This presentation argues that dealing with environmental prob-
lems is especially difficult because: (a) the phenomena occur 
as highly contextual, far-from-equilibrium, open natural sys-
tems best described by complexity theory rather than context-
free, stable, closed dimensions treated by traditional linear 
science. Congruently, (b) management policies and practices 
need to be based on complexity theory and not dominant posi-
tive science, since the latter cannot deal with the often surpris-
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ing ecosystem responses to perturbations, including well-
meant human “correctives”—a requirement made even more 
complex by the fact that diverse constituencies disagree on the 
values, goals, and means appropriate to the task. 
Because current approaches to natural resources simulate 
the future based on modeling of and extrapolation from past 
events, data that emphasize average conditions and incre-
mental growth provide an inadequate, even misleading, basis 
for planning, design, and action. Hence there is a need for new 
modes of research and practice, which would integrate qualita-
tive and quantitative dimensions if they are to enable us to 
understand environmental phenomena and experience and to 
develop strategies for successful ecological design. 
Evidence is presented that a promising contribution to 
what is needed is found in the shift to the use of “scenarios,” 
which can be distinguished from the traditional scientific 
claims to forecasting: “Scenarios are not predictions of what 
will happen. They are an exploration of what might happen. 
They are structural narratives about the possible future paths 
of a social-ecological system” (Peterson et al. 2003b). 
 
 
The People-Environment Relationship Rein-
terpreted as Triad through Philosopher J. G. 
Bennett’s Systematics of Three-ness 
 
David Seamon, Professor, Department of Architec-
ture, Kansas State Univ., Manhattan, Kansas 
 
Traditionally in the environmental disciplines, the people-
environment relationship has been interpreted in terms of 
some dyadic formulation—e.g., environment shaping people 
(environmental determinism); people shaping environment 
(possibilism); or the two in some sort of mutual interaction (as 
in an ecological conception). In this presentation, I argue that 
the people-environment relationship might also be understood 
through the threefold structure of geographical ensemble, 








ing. © 2010 D. Norton. 
To flesh out this threefold structure, I draw on British 
philosopher J. G. Bennett’s theory of “systematics,” an approach 
using the qualitative significance of number to explore phenom-
ena. Specifically, I focus on Bennett’s interpretation of three-
ness and what he called the triad  to explicate what he identified 
as six “universal processes”—identity, interaction, expansion, 
concentration, order, and 
freedom. I argue that 
each of these six proc-
esses offers a useful 
vantage point for rein-
terpreting various as-
pects of the people-
environment relation-
ship, or people-
environment triad, as I 
identify it h
scribe six processes: 
   1. place interactio
   2. place identity; 
   3. place creation; 
   4. place intensification
   5. place actualiz
   6. plac
 




ton  was one of sev-
eral images in 
Montana State Assistant Professor of Architecture  Zuzanna Karczewska’s paper, “Re-presenting the Space for 
the Body,” presented at the “Flesh and Space” conference held at Mississippi State University—see report, next 
page. In the drawing, Norton portrays graphically the lived links of his body-in-action as he works in his design 
studio. His focus is the shifting dynamic between the spaces of body and studio.  This dynamic is marked by dif-
ferent modes and intensities of engagement between Norton’s “lived body” and the “lived space” in which he 
works. We thank Norton and Karczewska for allowing us to reprint his draw
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Flesh and Space: Intertwining Merleau-Ponty 
and Architecture 
 
Annual Meeting, Merleau-Ponty Circle 




Trigg is a philosopher interested in the relationship between place, memory, and embodiment from a phenome-
nological perspective. One of his specific concerns is how liminal and ambiguous places can contribute to the 
formation of identity, both personal and collective. He is author of The Aesthetics of Decay (NY: Peter Lang, 
2006) The paper Trigg presented at the conference was entitled, “The Architecture of Eroticism: Place and the 
Memory of (Hyper)Flesh.”  www.dylantrigg.com. dylantrigg@hotmail.com. © 2010 Dylan Trigg. 
 
 
he relationship between phenomenologi-
cal philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and architecture is striking in its plenitude. 
With the exception of Martin Heidegger 
and Gaston Bachelard, no other phenomenologist 
has contributed as much to understanding how the 
natural and built environment affects our being-in-
the-world. With his concepts of the embodied sub-
ject, flesh, chiasm, wild being, and the intertwining 
of the visible and invisible, Merleau-Ponty fur-
nishes philosophers and architects with a rich and 
challenging set of ideas unparalleled in their depth. 
That the 34th Merleau-Ponty Circle Conference 
should be devoted to themes of spatiality and flesh 
is thus fitting and timely. Efficiently organized by 
architect Rachel McCann and philosopher Patricia 
Locke, the event was spread over three days, with a 
co-conference devoted to Merleau-Ponty and archi-
tecture held a day earlier. Focusing on themes such 
as movement, memory, materiality, metaphysics, 
and “matrixial flesh,” the scope of papers was broad 
in range, varied in quality, but united in theme. 
  
he conference’s first paper, presented by EAP’s 
own David Seamon, concerned the interface 
between space syntax and what Seamon termed 
“place ballet.” Divided into three parts, Seamon’s 
paper began with a concise overview of Bill Hill-
ier’s notion of space syntax with a focus on how 
habitual routines in place alter and transform our 
experience of an environment. Following this, Sea-
mon’s paper sought to bring space syntax into the 
scope of “place ballet,” demonstrating how each 
idea enrich and informs the other. This idea was fur-
ther fleshed out in the final part of the paper, in 
which the author situated place ballet and space 
syntax in a phenomenological context, identifying 
its grounding in Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. 
 
Singling out the idea of an “environmental 
flesh,” Seamon ended by positing the primacy of an 
ethical focus in the experience and design of the 
built environment, in the process giving form to the 
intercorporeal structure common to both phenome-
nology and space syntax. In many ways, this idea 
goes against the assumption that space syntax is 
overly concerned with an abstracted concept of the 
built environment. By emphasizing the potential 
alliance between phenomenology and space syn-
tax—even against Hiller’s own doubts—Seamon’s 
contribution is vital and refreshing.  
The subsequent panel focused on memory and 
meaning with papers by architect Guillermo Garma 
Montiel and cultural geographer Karen Wilson Bap-
tist. Both papers hinted at the complexities involved 
in linking practice with theory, a tension that ran 
throughout the conference. Baptist’s paper in par-
ticular, titled simply “Diaspora,” offered a rich 










and place. Considering how roadside memorials 
afford a place to grieve, her paper touched on the 
relation between spontaneous mourning and spec-
tral engagement, arguing that “the landscape inad-
vertently gathers the talismanic remnants of the 
dead, allowing the bereaved to eventually abandon 
the roadside memorial and to relinquish their dead 
to the landscape.” 
As rich as these themes are, Baptist’s paper was 
oddly lacking in a rigorous analysis of how these 
places are experienced. One can discern a tension 
between the landscape as a site of human remem-
brance and the landscape as an anonymous space 
indifferent to human desire. What takes place such 
that the landscape is elevated to the significance of 
being a memorial? Where does the memory dwell—
in the landscape or the human body, or in both? If 
both, then how is this communion between corpore-
ality and place possible? None of these questions, 
though implicit, were approached, perhaps partly 
because of the paper’s somewhat loose relationship 
to Merleau-Ponty, when in fact his account of time, 
space, and phenomena (e.g., the phantom limb) af-
fords a deep understanding of the spectral dimen-
sion of lived space.   
Given over to the theme of “Ontology of Lived 
Space,” the final panel of the day included two pa-
pers by architects Jassen Callender and David Kou-
kal. Callender’s paper, “Among Time’s Images: An 
Onto-Phenomenological Search for Extraordinary 
Experience,” provided a theoretically complex yet 
intriguing account of the “excess” in being, detail-
ing the interaction between thinkers as diverse as 
Bataille and Whitehead. Callender concluded that 
“An extraordinary experience is an experience of 
the excess of being which privileges the accumula-
tion of knowing over the iterative quality of truth.” 
A complex claim which perhaps merited more clari-
fication than time allotted.  
In contrast to the tendency to take Merleau-
Ponty as an exemplar of the body-as-unified, David 
Koukal gave a novel and cogent paper on a topic 
typically overlooked in phenomenology: torture. Yet 
far from contradicting Merleau-Ponty, Koukal’s 
well argued analysis of the spatiality and corporeal-
ity of torture, exemplified the scope of phenome-
nology (and Merleau-Ponty in particular) for deal-
ing with a topic often neglected. At stake in Kou-
kal’s paper was the claim that spatiality is so central 
to our being that once damaged by the incursion of 
torture, that unity is lost forever. With this negative 
formulation, the contingency of our embodied space 
is no longer taken-for-granted but thematized in its 
vulnerability.  
 
fter a successful first day focusing on flesh, 
architecture, and Merleau-Ponty, the next three 
days—Thursday through Saturday—were devoted 
to the annual meeting of the Merleau-Ponty Circle; 
in diverse ways, presentations expanded on the is-
sue of spatiality. Philosopher William Hamrick be-
gan on Thursday morning with a fine paper entitled 
“Topoanalysis,” a term taken from Bachelard and 
referring to the systematic analysis of intimate 
places in our lives. Hamrick linked this concept 
with Merleau-Ponty’s account of topological space. 
Hamrick set about rediscovering the meaning 
of an “original place in the world” through a careful 
analysis of his hometown, Ligonier, Pennsylvania. 
What followed was an evocative account of small-
town America examined through the prism of 
topoanalysis. Despite this—or perhaps because—
one wonders if this linage of thought inherited from 
Bachelard risks an insular account of home, dwell-
ing, and place. After all, the emphasis on origins as 
a source of orientation need not entail unity. 
One could argue that the “place-alienation” 
Hamrick largely ignored plays a far greater role in 
our experience of dwelling and remembering than 
his paper acknowledges. This is an especially preva-
lent issue when Hamrick spoke of no longer having 
access to the interior of his great-grandparent’s 
home. The disjunction established between inside 
and out sets in place a formidable set of contrasts, 
of which Hamrick’s paper, despite its overall vir-
tues, tended to overlook.  
 
hursday’s afternoon events began with a panel 
discussing philosopher Lawrence Hass’s re-
cently published Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy, 
which, if nothing else, served as excellent market-
ing tool for his work. Shortly after, English profes-
sor Nancy Barta Smith gave a provocative talk that 










generalized account of intercorporeal being. Despite 
claiming “not to speak for all twins,” her paper had 
the unusual outcome of positing a “collective sense 
of we-centric experience,” even suggesting that, 
“we all share the imitative potentials of a conjoined 
equilibrium.” 
While this claim was surrounded in some con-
fusion, it has the unfortunate sense of containing a 
homogenized account of human experience in 
which the idea of the autonomous individual is sup-
posedly demythologized through the development 
of empathy. While it is true that Merleau-Ponty 
speaks of things in the world as being made of the 
same “stuff”—namely, flesh—what this does not 
mean is that the flesh has any particular relation to 
kinship, harmony, or disharmony. 
Rather, the flesh is that which underscores and 
is prior to the split between subject and object, bind-
ing all things through being constitutive of the same 
“element.” In this sense, there is no tacit ethics to be 
mined in Merleau-Ponty’s flesh; as Toadvine (2009, 
p. 134) explains, “That we are folds of the world’s 
flesh, therefore, points to no particular ethical con-
sequences, environmental or otherwise.” Barta 
Smith’s claim that “flesh prolongs our embodied 
being and makes twins of us all” is not only errone-
ous as a philosophical claim but also potentially na-
ïve as an ethical and political statement.  
 
 highlight of Friday’s presentations was phi-
losophy doctoral student Bryan Norwood’s 
challenging paper, which was the recipient of the 
M.C. Dillon Award. Central to Norwood’s project is 
the task of assessing why phenomenologically ori-
entated architects are preoccupied with perceptual 
experience. Norwood’s paper thus took a polemical 
stance toward phenomenology, which, while not 
seeking to neglect the importance of perceptual ex-
perience, nonetheless sought to rethink phenome-
nology in thought and practice. 
Norwood’s approach was to introduce 
Deleuze’s thought into Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
the flesh. At the heart of this method is the question 
of human centrality. As Norwood, pointed out, 
“very rarely will a phenomenological architect or 
critic talk about the perception between two archi-
tectural objects.” Implicit in this assumption is the 
idea that human life transcends the places he or she 
experiences, thus denoting architecture as an illus-
tration of phenomenological ideas. The point is no-
table, as it questions the relation between architects 
and their employment of theory. Norwood’s contri-
bution was to posit the idea of “reversible architec-
ture.” By this term, he refers to the possibility of a 
“pre-human architecture” that calls upon Merleau-
Ponty’s enigmatic idea of “wild being.” 
The advantage of such a project is that it puts 
forward an architecture that precludes a transcen-
dental subject, given that the notion of “wild being” 
refers to being that precedes the split between sub-
ject and object. As such, the previous model of phe-
nomenology as person-centered is now extended 
(but not displaced) to include “a person, a friend, a 
large building, a door, walls, words about architec-
ture, things around the architecture, and dirt on the 
architecture.” 
This move of allowing objects to speak to one 
another establishes an entirely new area of research, 
so far largely untapped in Merleau-Ponty’s incipient 
notion of “wild being.” Norwood’s paper is thus 
inventive and striking, and unlike the majority of 
papers approaching phenomenology from a broadly 
poststructuralist perspective, his dialogue between 
Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze was not only construc-
tive but judicious, too.  
Friday’s keynote paper was given by philoso-
pher Galen Johnson, whose talk was based on his 
forthcoming book on beauty and Merleau-Ponty, 
The Retrieval of the Beautiful. If the talk is an indi-
cation of the contents of the book more broadly, 
then the reader can expect an extraordinary, nu-
anced, and impassioned examination of Merleau-
Ponty’s aesthetics as a whole.  
 
aturday, the final day of the conference, in-
cluded papers by philosopher David Morris and 
architectural theorist Alberto Pérez-Gómez. Mor-
ris’s paper dealt with the relationship between archi-
tecture and memory through Merleau-Ponty’s ideas 
of temporality, habit, passivity, and space. Follow-
ing an account of the phenomenology of remember-
ing, Morris moved on to argue that “temporality and 
spatiality are two aspects of our experience of our-










Applying this claim to the experience of place, 
Morris gave an incisive though equally dense analy-
sis of how “architecture articulates an ‘I can’ out-
side our bodies.” Morris concluded his argument 
with the concept of what he called keep-places, 
which emphasize the movement of memory in and 
through place rather than its static retrieval. 
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Implicit in this concept is an ethics of architec-
ture that singles out certain places that encourage 
the learning and re-learning of a “singular past,” 
rather than breeding an interchangeable experience: 
“It is the house, city, or place well lived in that is 
the preserve of memory—not airport hotels that ap-
proach interchangeability.” 
This is a complex claim; suffice it to say that 
precluding one place because of supposed “inter-
changeability” risks a premature assessment of the 
environment at odds with phenomenology’s com-
mitment to an unprejudiced experience of things. 
This criticism aside, Morris’s paper was tightly ar-
gued and insightful. Despite lacking an affective 
account of how memory and place touch our sense 
of self, Morris’s argument provided ample inspira-
tion for further thought.  
Alberto Pérez-Gómez’s paper provided an ex-
tremely rich defence of a phenomenological ap-
proach to architecture, which surveyed a broad 
spectrum of themes and ideas, while simultaneously 
focusing on the depth of visual perception. For 
Pérez-Gómez, “Depth is the dimension of percep-
tual cohesion and reversibility that allows for things 
to appear as mutually dependent through their 
autonomy and, reciprocally, to manifest their ‘ob-
jectivity’ through mutual concealment.” 
Returning to the broad theme of the conference, 
Pérez-Gómez suggested that it is flesh that allows 
this reversible depth to emerge and envelop things 
in its elemental hold. Pérez-Gómez explored these 
ideas with reference to Le Corbusier, giving atten-
tion to the architect’s relationship to temporality, as 
it relates to music and space more generally: “Depth 
is here re-invested with a mysterious quality analo-
gous in vision to the interiority communicated by 
speech, poetry, and musical harmony.” 
 
verall, then, the conference was a success. 
Alongside several excellent theoretical exami-
nations of Merleau-Ponty, many of the papers bene-
fited from a direct application of the philosophy in 
question, with Koukal’s paper particulaly exemplary 
in this respect. 
If there is an overarching criticism to be voiced, 
two points might be raised. First, given the com-
plexity of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the embodied 
subject, the conference’s chief focus on the “per-
sonal body” in distinction to the “prepersonal body” 
testifies to the need for further work in this aspect of 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Why is this distinction 
important? Because it addresses the depth of the 
human body as having different “layers,” involving 
for Merleau-Ponty “another subject beneath me, for 
whom a world exists before I am,” which is the 
“anonymous” body (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 296). 
The absence of the anonymous body in Merleau-
Ponty presents a shortfall in his view of lived ex-
perience.  
Second, the result of this absence of anonymity 
is that a delimited account of Merleau-Ponty is pre-
sented—namely, one that privileges felicitous in-
stances of embodiment. After all, what the pre-
personal body brings to light in Merleau-Ponty is 
that ethical judgments are of a different order to the 
ontology of the body itself. As such, by focusing on 
an “unethical architecture” (as philosopher Doro-
thea Olkowski put it in her paper) as primary, one 
runs the risk of losing sight of the fact that embodi-
ment is fundamentally ambiguous, not only struc-
turally, but existentially too. As Merleau-Ponty 
writes, “my life slips away from me on all sides and 
is circumscribed by impersonal zones” (ibid., p. 
386). 
The anonymity of space and embodiment 
means that we forever yield the possibility of being 
lost in space. Yet being lost is not necessarily a con-
dition to be “redeemed” through “ethical” architec-
ture, but an experience to be understood as constitu-
tive of the very experience of architecture.  
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eturning from a late lunch and walking 
up Walnut Street to my office a block 
away, I was enchanted by a little girl, 
maybe four years old, walking and stop-
ping, then skipping and running, then stopping 
again to look at the ground where some tiny glitter 
arrested her eye. Her mother was ten feet ahead, 
immersed in a cell-phone conversation. The little 
girl was literally bouncing off walls as she passed 
along the embellished facades. 
      Architecturally, this Philadelphia block is a rich 
composite of environmental design, incorporating 
the elegant Rittenhouse Plaza on one corner and the 
20th-Street Chatham apartments on the other. Over 
the years, I’ve noticed that few people actually see 
what they are walking beside, so engrossed are they 
with thoughts, cell phones, or iPods. I have partici-
pated in neighborhood tours with residents who 
have never noticed the amazing ornament enriching 
the buildings—for example, the startling images of 
cherub faces peering out from moldings, surround-
ing doors, and following passers-by with their eyes. 
There are all manner of creatures stationed along 
the walls, windows, and roof cornices. At the corner 
of 20th Street, one looks up to see the marvelous 
great griffins and gargoyles projecting from gothic 
pinnacles of the Chatham apartments’ roofline. 
      I see these environmental elements because I am 
an architect “of the traditional persuasion”—in 
other words, educated as a modernist but eventually 
converted to Classicism, a 2500-year tradition in 
Western culture. As I write this claim, I am aware of 
how odd or arrogant or backward it might sound. 
But when I saw the little girl last week, experienc-
ing the street as adults these days seldom do, I felt a 
confirmation that she (and I) hold sight of some-
thing important that many others have lost. 
      In the 1960s, we heard the declaration, “Be here 
now!” which, from this architect’s point of view, 
means “Be where you are” rather than somewhere 
else—for example, talking on the cell phone. When 
guests on Public Radio say, “Glad to be here,” I 
cringe because I know those guests are not in Phila-
delphia (where the host is situated) but in Chicago, 
Los Angeles, or even farther afield. What has mod-
ern life, modernist architecture, and cyberspace 
done to our sense of place, of home, of our spatial 
relationships to the geographical worlds in which 
we actually find ourselves? 
      Too often today, we live in a virtual world of 
radical disjunction and jarring irrelevances to the 
point that we often don’t know where we are in the 
moment—physically, intellectually, emotionally, or 
spiritually. But that little girl I saw on Walnut Street 
was entirely engaged in where we all ought to be. 
She was tuned into the street and to the city and ul-
timately to the wholeness of it all. Today, our envi-
ronment in all respects—our urban fabric, televi-
sion, internet, entertainment, the visual world in 
every way—is woefully disconnected. We no longer 
perceive wholeness, though at some visceral level 
we still admire it and know it should be present. 
      The influential 19th-century educator Friedrich 
Froebel wrote that “Every Child brings with him 
into the world the natural disposition to see cor-
rectly what is before him, or, in other words, the 
truth. If things are shown to him in their connec-
tions, his soul perceives them thus as a conception. 
But if, as often happens, things are brought before 
his mind singly, or piecemeal and in fragments [as 
they are today], then the natural disposition to see 
correctly is perverted to the opposite, and the 
healthy mind is perplexed.” 
       One needs only to reflect upon a typical day to 
see how thoroughly fragmented our lives have be-
come. We know we need to be whole. Let that child 
lead us. Let us all learn to see in the way she saw 
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lthough the nearest human neighbors on 
Bruny Island are a kilometer away, wal-
labies, echidnas, and dozens of bird spe-
cies come right up to our house. Living 
in such a situation, Vicki and I often think about 
“treading more lightly on the Earth,” both as a per-
sonal question and as a broader social issue. 
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As two recent radio talks illustrate, current de-
bate on the politics and psychology of sustainability 
is polarized. Discussing her recent Getting a Grip, 
Frances Moore Lappe, involved with global food 
and ecological questions since the publication of her 
best-selling Diet for a Small Planet in 1971, argued 
that current forms of repre-
sentative democracy rob 
people of a sense of con-
tributing to the common 
good and lead to a depleted 
sense of self [1]. The con-
sumer society, she claimed, 
is based on a “mentality of 
lack,” in which one can 
never have enough, 
whereas in reality people in 
Western countries already 
have all they need and 
more. Participating in a liv-
ing democracy would enable people to live richer 
and more fulfilling lives while contributing to a 
more just and sustainable world. 
In sharp contrast, Austin Williams, a London-
based architect and author of Enemies of Progress: 
Dangers of Sustainability, provoked controversy 
when he presented a vigorous challenge to “sustain-
ability orthodoxy” on radio a few days later [2]. He 
described most environmental advocates as risk-
averse, moralistic, parochial, obsessed with a phi-
losophy of limitation, living in a state of dread, 
lacking creativity and aspiration, and having no 
sense of exhilaration in life. He championed the in-
vigorating, innovative spirit of the modern city that 
could deal with any of the real challenges of human 
development. He urged listeners to aspire to a life 
without limitation and reject the false choice be-
tween quality of life and quantity of consumption. 
Beyond my general interest in these conflicting 
viewpoints, I was fascinated by the stark differences 
over the relationship be-
tween sustainable living and 
psychological well-being 
[3]. Is the “mentality of 
lack” embedded in the con-
sumer society or in the 
minds of sustainability ad-
vocates? Is sustainability a 
matter of choice or neces-
sity, and does it compro-
mise or contribute to a 
sense of richness and abun-
dance? How do these mat-
ters play out in daily life? 
 
’ve been considering such questions in relation to 
our experience when we moved into our modest 
house by the edge of Blackstone Bay three years 
ago. The only power source installed by the previ-
ous owner was a car battery connected to two small 








for two low-energy light bulbs for an hour in the 
evening. Clearly, we needed more to live here full 
time. Faced with the choice between having power 
lines strung over our land and paying electricity 
bills for the rest of our lives, or generating our own 
electricity through a larger solar-energy system, we 
opted for the latter.  
In retrospect, we were two naïve enthusiasts 
who took on a more sustainable lifestyle in a remote 
setting without connections to power, water, or sew-
age. We were ill-prepared for the complexities that 
ensued. It seems timely to explore our experiences 
when the need to reduce our collective carbon foot-
print because of global warming becomes pressing 
for everyone. There are many moral exhortations in 
the media to “do the right thing for the environ-
ment,” but phenomenological analyses of what it is 
really like to undertake a more lower-impact way of 
living are less common. 
 
or a year after we bought our place on Bruny, 
we were still living in a suburban house in the 
Blue Mountains west of Sydney. In preparation for 
our move, we contacted a Tasmanian solar energy 
company I will call “Simply Solar.” To 
calculate how many solar panels we 
would need, we first had to prepare our 
household “power profile,” an effort that 
was immediately eye-opening and hum-
bling. We looked at the small metal 
plates underneath every appliance we 
thought we might want in our new home 
to find how many watts they consumed. 
I had no idea that there was such a dif-
ference in wattage between a blender 
and an electric toaster, for example, or 
between a tape deck and a stereo re-
ceiver. With each item, we asked our-
selves the question: Do we really need 
this? Right away, many appliances, such 
as toasters and electric heaters, ruled 
themselves out as too energy-profligate. 
Our next challenge was to estimate the number 
of hours per week we would use each appliance. 
How many hours would we have the computer on? 
How many electric lights would we use and for how 
long? To even begin to make these estimates, we 
had to pay much closer attention to how we lived. 
We kept a diary of our daily energy use, which was 
uncomfortably revealing in terms of how many 
electrical appliances two relatively “green-minded” 
people were actually using. Then we had to project 
how much our lifestyle and electricity consumption 
would change in our new, “simple” life. 
Much more aware of our own use of electricity, 
we now noticed how many appliances friends and 
neighbors used. There are none so zealous as the 
newly converted, and we tried to keep our com-
ments to ourselves as we saw houses lit up like fairy 
castles, televisions blaring with no one watching, 
leaf blowers being used rather than rakes. We were 
astounded at how much energy consumption was 
advertised as being a wonderful thing: “Super pow-
erful, super suction” 3000-watt vacuum cleaners, 
massive 2500-watt hairdryers that “dry your hair 
even faster,” and power tools of every description.  
 
s the next step in the process, Simply Solar 
installed solar panels, inverter, regulator, and a 
massive bank of batteries to meet our projected 
needs [4]. Since the total cost was only slightly 
more than electric power poles stretched across our 
paddocks, we were very happy with the 
arrangement. We would be generating 
all our energy needs from the sun, with 
low maintenance, and no more electric-
ity bills. When a man from the electric 
power company arrived a few months 
later to read our meter, we delightedly 
and rather smugly told him there wasn’t 
one. Unfortunately, matters did not re-
main so simple. 
There was indeed little mainte-
nance to be done. Twice a year at each 
equinox, the inclination of the panels 
needed adjusting and the specific gravi-
ties of the batteries needed regular 
checking. But there was a new lan-
guage to learn. The digital read-out on 
the solar energy regulator was in amp hours per day 
(AH). Although I could measure the AH coming 
into the system, I couldn’t calculate how many AH 
we were consuming. Autumn progressed, and the 
battery specific gravities started to decline, indicat-
ing that the system was no longer fully charged. I 









up, petrol-driven generator didn’t seem to arrest the 
decline as the grey days of winter settled in. 
As I was struggling with a new language, I was 
also wrestling with inner demons. Behind my wry 
self-description of being “technically challenged” 
lay a psychologically slippery slope. I quickly had 
to overcome my fear of approaching any unfamiliar 
machine without an expert by my side, since all the 
“experts” were in Hobart and reluctant to make the 
ferry journey to Bruny. Technical instructions by 
phone in regard to our declining batteries often left 
me puzzled and, at worst, in confused desperation.  
I re-experienced boyhood anxieties about my 
lack of practical aptitude and common sense. Rather 
than patiently explain how to construct or repair 
things, my father tended to tell me gruffly to “use 
my head” and to “grow up.” Caught in these child-
hood echoes, I was slow to realize that our solar-
energy problem was not my technical incompetence 
so much as Simply Solar’s gross over-estimation of 
how much power, in the long Tasmanian winter, our 
panels would generate. When a different technical 
team finally paid us a visit, they recommended we 
install a wind generator and replace the seriously 
underpowered back-up generator and charger left us 
by the previous owners. Meanwhile, to let our bat-
teries recover, we shut off our low-energy refrigera-
tor and prevailed upon neighbors to store food in 
their freezer.  
 
e found the idea of installing a wind genera-
tor appealing. Wind is a strong part of our 
life on Bruny, with frequent sea breezes, hearty 
winds, and occasional gales from the Southern 
Ocean. Using another natural element to generate 
power without significant environmental impact 
was fine, as long as it wasn’t noisy and didn’t harm 
the birds. A visit to a wind turbine in operation on 
the mainland satisfied us on both counts, and we 
placed our order.  
By the time these additions to our alternative 
energy system were installed, our original budget 
for alternative energy had almost doubled. Still, it 
was striking to see how our attitude to windy days 
shifted. Vicki had previously found strong winds 
unpleasant but, now that we knew the wind was 
charging our batteries, it wasn’t so bothersome. It 
became an informative part of daily life—a quick 
glance at the generator blades told me the direction 
and strength of the wind. One spring afternoon I 
was striding down toward the house with a bracing 
Channel wind blowing straight in my face and the 
sun glinting off the water into my eyes. I exulted in 
the strength of the elements and lengthened my 
stride. “It’s a high-energy day today,” I declared to 
Vicki, and we enjoyed the new layer of meaning 
that term now had for us. 
The next winter, we found that Simply Solar’s 
predictions that “we should be okay now” weren’t 
entirely correct. The battery charge still declined, 
though more slowly. For three months, we had to 
use our back-up generator more often than ex-
pected. Our wind generator is rated at about the 
same one-kilowatt capacity as our combined solar 
panels, but that rating is at an average wind speed of 
30 miles per hour. 
Even a breezy place like ours, however, doesn’t 
have such constant, high winds. Visitors frequently 
marvel at our whirling wind generator, apparently 
generating great quantities of electricity. In reality, 
to generate large amounts of power, the blades must 
rotate faster than the eye can see. In fact, the solar 
panels sitting unobtrusively on the roof do most of 
the work. 
Over the past year, we have only produced 
twelve percent of our power from wind, though it 
does have the additional benefit of acting as a 
“trickle charger”—in other words, replacing small 
amounts of battery power overnight. In short, it is 
wise to stand outside and measure average wind 
speed throughout the year before deciding whether 
to buy a wind generator, but this is one of the many 
things that alternative power companies don’t al-
ways tell potential customers. 
 
ppearance and reality also diverge when it 
comes to storage batteries. When Simply Solar 
brought in twelve huge batteries, each nearly three 
feet tall, I was impressed. Only after our first disas-
trous winter was I able to persuade a technician to 
explain the situation: 
“Think of it this way: Those batteries fully 
charged hold about 1000 AH. What’s your average 
daily usage?” 










“Okay. Now, you want to keep them at least 
eighty-percent charged for long-term battery health, 
so that gives you about 200 AH leeway.” 
“But that’s only a four-day supply!” 
“Yep,” he smiled. “People think there’s months 
of storage in these batteries because they’re so big. 
Of course, there’s always some little bit coming in 
even on a calm cloudy day, but you get the point. 
You’d need a large room full of batteries to keep the 
average house going through winter down here.” 
I blanched when I thought of the extra cost. 
Suddenly, it all seemed so much 
more precarious—a safe-energy 
storage capacity measured in days 
rather than months. A year later, 
though, we have relaxed now that 
we know more about how the sys-
tem works. We haven’t bought a 
roomful of batteries but, rather, 
have learned what we can and can-
not do. While large-scale utility 
power appears to be more reliable, 
it now looks equally precarious in 
a different way, since most of Aus-
tralia’s electricity is generated by 
coal and contributes to destabiliz-




orking within the amount of 
power and water we can generate and collect 
now feels less like a restriction and more like an 
opportunity. Coupled with living on an island where 
there is no store and having a fixed income now that 
I have “retired,” this discipline of “making do” is 
steadily permeating all aspects of our lives—what 
we use, what we wear, what we grow and eat, what 
we re-use and recycle.  
 
Vicki has been more steadfast than I have. One 
morning she noticed some discarded chicken wire 
by the side of a local road. “Oh, that’ll be good for 
fencing our veggie bed, let’s pick it up.” 
I looked doubtfully at the tangle in the grass. 
“What, that?” I asked. “It’s a mess and full of 
weeds. If we’re going to do something, let’s do it 
right and get some new wire from the hardware 
store. We’re not that poor.” 
“That’s not the point. This wire’s here, it’s lit-
tering the side of the road and we can use it.” 
“Oh, OK.” Still grumbling, I straightened out 
the jumble of mesh, pulled the weeds out, rolled it 
up and put it in the back of the station wagon. Over 
lunch, I pursued the topic, saying that I didn’t want 
to get into a poverty mentality, constantly restricting 
ourselves unnecessarily so that our lives shrank. I 
wanted an abundance mentality and a rich life to-
gether. Vicki argued for the value and pleasures of 
frugality, saying she wasn’t talking about self-denial 
and doing without what we really needed. 
I scavenged some old metal posts from a fallen 
fence on our land and attached the 
chicken wire. We’d heard that floppy 
overhanging wire on the top of a fence 
discourages hungry, climbing possums, 
so I used some discarded, thicker fenc-
ing wire to construct an outward curve. 
Given my childhood experiences, I had 
no confidence in my ability to impro-
vise, tinker, and construct things, yet 
that was precisely what I was being 
called upon to do because of our isolated 
situation and low-tech approach. Our 
“possum-proof” fence worked and Vicki 
has been lavish in her praise, which has 
helped reduce my habitual feelings of 
incompetence. My mantra has become 
“this is another learning experience.” 
One of the things we are learning is to recognize 
and rely upon each other’s strengths. Vicki is 
quicker on the uptake, more intuitive, and more far-
sighted, whereas I am more deliberate, perseverant, 
and thorough.  
The vegetable garden has been one of our 
greatest sources of joy. Although Vicki had created 
a magnificent flower garden in England, neither of 
us had grown vegetables before. Vicki researched 
and designed the garden from scratch, making 
raised beds from driftwood we filled with seaweed, 
and hay and horse manure from our neighbors. 
Within months this base was breaking down into a 
rich soil and we were harvesting our own food. I get 
inordinate pleasure from collecting the salad greens 
and herbs before lunch. I have the abundance I 
wanted, too. There are bushel baskets full of our 
tomatoes and apples. As I write, our neighbor’s 
pears and quinces line our kitchen walls. We are 
W
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eating more seasonal produce, accepting what is 
given in each season’s bounty, and having less of 
what is not locally provided. 
We are enjoying doing everything we can to re-
cycle and reduce our carbon footprint. Nearly all 
our clothes come from second-hand stores. Vicki is 
delighted when she finds something useful from the 
“fifty-cent rack.” Not only are these perfectly good 
clothes a tiny fraction of the cost of new apparel, 
but they don’t consume resources to produce or do 
they clog up landfills in the way they would if they 
had been discarded. Our only water supply is the 
rainwater we collect in tanks from our roof, and we 
have learned to restrict our usage in dry times and 
still have enough to water the many young native 
trees we have planted. We have a composting toilet 
that uses no water.  
 
ur move to a more sustainable life has clearly 
involved a substitution of physical labor for 
fossil-fuel energy. I mash garbanzo beans by hand 
rather than put them into a blender to make hum-
mus. I cart hay, manure, and seaweed rather than 
apply commercial fertilizer to the garden. I feel 
more vitality and well-being than ever before, but it 
has had consequences for my 57-year-old body. If I 
go to the paddocks (a subject for a future letter), I 
put on my “velcro armor” of back brace, elbow 
strap, and knee braces. I’ve had to pay more atten-
tion to my own physical sustainability and, as with 
our energy situation, it requires much more aware-
ness and self-knowledge. After we both suffered 
injuries, we had to learn from a physiotherapist how 
to lift and move things properly. She described the 
progression from a state of unconscious incompe-
tence (being unaware of lifting badly) to conscious 
competence (only lifting well when we remember to 
pay attention) to unconscious competence (the 
body’s lifting correctly of its own accord). Since my 
preferred learning style is not “learning by doing,” I 
have yet to experience the third stage. 
 
hat can be said of our journey into sustain-
ability from a phenomenological point of 
view? The first observation is that for most people 
in the Western world, electricity has become part of 
the lifeworld, the taken-for-granted quality of eve-
ryday life that is of central interest to phenomenolo-
gists. Flick the switch and the light comes on. It’s 
automatic. Now that we generate our own power on 
site, however, consuming and producing electricity 
has become a subject of regular conversation and 
awareness. I hadn’t expected that the light would be 
shone, on one hand, on my own attitudes and fears 
of technical inadequacy; and, on the other hand, on 
the psychology of learning. No longer taking elec-
tricity for granted has involved coming face-to-face 
with some demons I thought had been subdued—
feelings of helplessness, isolation and incompe-
tence, and my desires for comfort and security. 
The experience of reducing our ecological foot-
print has brought home to me the inseparability of 
person and world that Heidegger called Dasein, or 
being-in-the-world. There are many aspects of this 
process of connecting what had previously seemed 
to be separate. For example, when we lived in the 
Blue Mountains, there was no relationship between 
local weather conditions and the amount of power 
available to our household. Now, my body responds 
to the vigorous embrace of gusting winds and blaz-
ing sun at the same time our solar panels and wind 
turbine are charging the batteries for the house. 
Turning on the tap now connects us to our seasonal 
rainfall, and we can no longer blithely assume that 
there will be water available whenever we want it. 
The soundscape of our world has changed, the 
house reverberates to the strong rush of the wind 
and the particularity of bird calls, not the noise of 
television beamed in from afar. We have made more 
connection with our physicality as human ani-
mals—the way we move in physical work, the food 
we grow and eat, our waste. As we experience our 
own material and mental fragility more acutely, we 
see the vulnerability of our land to local threats of 
drought, erosion, invasive species, and the global 
threat of climate change.  
 
he barriers to sustainability for us have been as 
much psychological as technological. The ide-
alism and enthusiasm with which we set out was 
accompanied by a sense of self-righteousness, de-
spite our best efforts to pretend otherwise. This has 
given way to a more sober assessment of our limita-
tions in the face of far greater physical and psycho-











experience great pleasure and joy from our life here, 
I still go through periods of resistance to the disci-
pline of living within our ecological means, fol-
lowed by acceptance, even pleasure, in “making 
do.” I’m coming to appreciate that what we are 






I admit that on occasion I have been the sort of 
self-righteous and fearful environmental advocate 
that Austin Williams decries. My worry about our 
developing a “poverty mentality” is reminiscent of 
his critique, but though he calls for a life without 
limitation, I’ve come to see his viewpoint as more 
limited than Frances Moore Lappe’s. Despite suc-
cumbing at times to the “mentality of lack,” I’ve 
learned much about genuine abundance through re-
ducing our ecological footprint. Deeper connectivity 
with our immediate world as a lived experience, not 
just as an attractive concept, has brought a greater 
vitality and sense of “well-
being-in-the-wo
As regards choice and ne-
cessity, it is possible that this 
generation could choose to ig-
nore the challenge that climate 
change presents and thereby 
condemn more species to extinc-
tion and deprive future genera-
tions of the choices that we take 
for granted. The alternative is to 
make a choice at a deeper level 
and embrace at least the moral 
necessity of what must be done. 
This raises a new set of ques-
tions about how the task can be 
undertaken with the innovative, 
invigorating spirit that Williams 
champions, particularly in the cities where most 
people live. Surely it isn’t necessary to move to a 
remote location to learn the hard lessons that we 
have: Ecological limits aren’t the enemy of creativ-
ity and well-being but can be their source.  
Acceptance of what is given and the limitations 
that come with it can bring a deep, almost paradoxi-
cal, gratitude. In The Snow Leopard, Peter Matthies-
sen encounters a crippled lama in remote Nepal: 
 
I wonder how he feels about his isolation in the silences of 
Tsakang, which he has not left in eight years now and, because 
of his legs, may never leave again… Indicating his twisted 
legs without a trace of self-pity or bitterness, as if they be-
longed to all of us, he casts his arms wide to the sky and the 
snow mountains, the high sun and the dancing sheep, and cries 
“Of course I am happy here! It’s wonderful! Especially when I 
have no choice!” [5]  
 
 
aking do with less is more, for us at least. 
More enriching, more fulfilling, more enli-
vening. Opportunities abound for us to live even 
more resourcefully and resiliently with what we are 
given. I was looking for abundance in the wrong 
place when I argued with Vicki about the chicken 
wire. It’s not about the things we can afford, much 
less our material consumption. Rather, it’s about 
opening my eyes and heart to the richness of what I 
am given each day in this place co-inhabited by 
such remarkable beings as herons and sea eagles. 
The real poverty is to see myself sur-
rounded by internal limitations and 
external restrictions rather than by 
fresh opportunities to learn and to 
flourish.  
Collectively, we must learn to 
live within our ecological means. We 
have enough. Isn’t that wonderful? 




1. F. Moore Lappe, Getting a Grip: 
Clarity, Creativity ad Courage in a World 
Gone Mad (Cambridge, MA: Small Planet 
Media, 2008).   
2. A. Williams, The Enemies of Pro-
gress: Dangers of Sustainability (London: 
Imprint Books, 2008). 
3. The difference can perhaps partially be attributed to 
the context within which the two speakers work. Frances 
Moore Lappe, Director of the Small Planet Institute, has pri-
marily been working in Third World countries on food and 
development issues, while Austin Williams works principally 
in the City of London as the Director of the Future Cities Pro-
ject. 
4. To be specific, we have six 160-watt solar panels and 
twelve deep-cycle storage batteries. 
5. P. Matthiessen, 1978. The Snow Leopard (London: 
Penguin), p. 246. 
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hilosophy’s proper object is the creation, 
propagation, contextualization, analysis, 
and understanding of the concept. For ex-
ample, what is the relationship between 
words and the ideas they represent? How can a set 
of concepts work as a kind of “meaning ecology” to 
provide specific cultural or disciplinary needs? 
Where do new concepts come from, and how can 
we be deliberate about their creation? How might 
we extend concepts to a new sphere or along a new 
trajectory? How might we use concepts appropri-
ately yet creatively? 
 Disciplines have resources for systematically asking questions and answering them. Both ques-tions and answers are necessary, but it is questions that are said to be on the way to something more 
substantial. I would like to question our questions— 
to see where our concepts come from and what 
work they do. 
P
In this essay, I consider two ways by which 
philosophers might interrogate the concept of land-
scape: first, the history and adaptation of concepts; 
second, phenomenology. Both approaches have im-
plications for the relationship between language and 
landscape. Superficially, the first may seem an “ex-
ternal” way of understanding a concept through its 
“provenance,” while the second may seem “inter-
nal” in the sense that phenomenology takes up ques-
tions of subjectivity. 
      Landscape is an intriguing concept to think of in 
these terms. It often stands for a host of other place 
and environmental words. I once asked a professor 
who taught landscape architecture what she told her 
students about what landscape was. Her answer was 
that she didn’t tell them anything. Rather she asked 
them what they thought it was. Students gave an-
swers that ranged from place to home to terrain to a 
host of other things. She was fine with that. 
I argue these two approaches need each other—
that each opens to the other. More precisely, I at-
tempt to demonstrate that the concept of landscape 
is a useful context for thinking about how meaning 
is shaped culturally and how speaking and referring 
are not just afterthoughts of an already constructed 
subjectivity but are constitutive of it. In other 
words, our sense of landscape, like our sense of 
place, is fundamental to who we are. It is not just an 
idea deployed to serve a descriptive, analytic, or 
theoretical purpose. 
In fact, landscape is not all these things. It is 
not the same as place, land, home, or terrain. Its 
provenance is different, and its current uses cannot 
be interchanged with other place-related terms. In 
short, we must be clear on the concept we use. 
This need for clarity also makes a difference 
because different concepts arise from different dis-
ciplinary methods and questions. We may use the 
same word across those disciplines or even within 
the same discipline, but in fact the concepts are not 
the same because they usually do different work. 
 
Traveling across Disciplines 
The concept of landscape has traveled across disci-
plinary boundaries. Its provenance passes through 










many other ways. There are moonscapes, seascapes, 
cityscapes, and so forth. Roberto Matta and other 
surrealists painted “inscapes”—the “scape” of the 
interior world. People speak of a political or reli-
gious landscape. 
What these various uses share in common is 
engagement with the land, either by traveling 
through or living with it. These uses of landscape 
involve a recognition of contours and a sense that 
the land makes a whole rather than a piecemeal 
composite of discrete parts. These uses suggest land 
as narrative, whether placed on the land in the proc-
ess of naming and representing it or implicit in a 
natural or human engagement with the land. There 
is an element of temporality in these uses of narra-
tive, illustrated most literally in the history of land-
scape painting, which often included ruins or some 
indication of the interaction of the human past with 
the quotidian present. 
Arguably, the advent of geographic-positioning 
systems (GPS) signals the end of landscape, since, 
through use of this technology, there is no longer 
the necessity of direct engagement with the land. 
With GPS, we do not need to read the land, either 
literally or through textual proxies such as maps. 
We follow instructions, based on geographical in-
formation readable primarily through a device, 
which fixes position not by any aspect of lived hu-
man meaning but through overlapping signals that 
triangulate positions on an abstract grid. 
With GPS, our environmental embodiment 
does not need to unfold as we move through the 
land. Rather, we are self-contained and apart from 
the land, through which we still move but from one 
digital marker to the next. Our engagement with the 
land becomes instrumental in that a digital indicator 
or mechanical voice provides directions and is not 
concerned with what lies in between. Places are first 
of all coordinate points rather than geographical in-
tensifications. Nothing is any longer related to his-
tory or myth. Removed from narrative and shifted 
to technology, navigation is taken out of language. 
Rather than claiming that GPS marks the death 
of landscape, it might be better to say that this tech-
nology points toward a new means of engaging the 
landscape. At the beginning of the modern era, our 
orienteering moved from reading “texts” more di-
rectly inscribed in the land or written about the land 
to deciphering schematic representations of the land 
expressed in latitude and longitude. At the same 
time, landscape painting brought the human back 
into the world by pictorially representing people as 
engaged in that land. What we lost in the map, we 
recovered in the picture. 
Similarly, with the rise of the GPS, we engage 
the landscape in a different way. GPS takes the bur-
den of a particular kind of way finding out of narra-
tive, which is thus freed to do other things with 
landscape. In this sense, cultural engagement is par-
ticularly important, partly because we are in need of 
new ways of understanding what it means to live in 
and with the land—not just on it. 
On one hand, we could interpret landscape as a 
system of signs arising from a particular culture and 
history. On the other hand, we could interpret land-
scape as an “ecology” of concepts shared among 
disciplines but changing according to disciplinary 
demands. I use the term “disciplinary” here broadly, 
to indicate any making of knowledge with an ob-
ject, method, and history. This difference can be 
phrased in terms of “synchronic” and “dia-
chronic”—in other words, understanding how con-
cepts are used informally at a particular moment in 
time vs. understanding how concepts become for-
malized, disciplinary property. 
Why is this difference important? Because 
landscape is not synonymous with land, territory, 
region, or even place. In the history of Western art, 
for example, landscape eventually took on a charac-
ter of its own. We can trace this shift through the 
paintings of Claude Lorrain through the Dutch mas-
ters to the American Hudson River School and, 
later, the Canadian Group of Seven. 
Today, the sense of landscape often moves 
away from a literal connection with land to more 
abstract expressions—we speak, for example, of a 
“landscape of corporate culture” or “the web as a 
landscape through which we navigate.” If we are 
cognitive scientists, we might highlight the “land-
scape of the brain.” 
In this sense, to speak of landscape is to speak 
of spatial movement, whether literal or figurative, 
remembered or anticipated, solitary or collective. In 
one significant sense, the space is created by the 
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movement and does not pre-exist our engagement 
with it. We see the land as something. In ecological 
psychologist James Gibson’s words, it “affords” 
something for us, just as a chair “affords” sitting.  
 
Phenomenology of Landscape 
When we think about phenomenology and place, we 
need to distinguish between different styles and ap-
proaches. In founding phenomenology, Edmund 
Husserl sought to find the universal in experience 
by bracketing off metaphysics, including ideas such 
as “objectivity” and “subjectivity.” 
In contrast, Martin Heidegger was much more 
interested in interpreting human experience, includ-
ing the nature of human inhabitation, dwelling, and 
place making.  For Heidegger, we are always caught 
up with that which we know. “Dwelling-in” de-
scribes that engagement. What we build frames the 
world in ontological ways—for example, in ways 
that either reveal our humanness more fully or cover 
it over and reduce us and our world to instrumental 
things. Yet again, we can speak of Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty’s phenomenology, which builds on the 
lived body as the first site of experience—an ap-
proach that might be called “embodied phenome-
nology.” 
Edward Casey is one philosopher currently 
thinking about landscape. His Representing Place: 
Landscape Painting and Maps (2002) sketches out 
the provenance of the term and examines what it 
means to represent landscape. Casey begins with the 
Heideggerian claim that we dwell in the land and 
thus turn it into landscape as we inscribe ourselves 
on it. Further, landscape becomes the site in which 
our subjectivity emerges and is made manifest. Ca-
sey then explores the idea that the landscape con-
cept has a history, which accrues a set of meanings 
by the path that it has taken through various forms 
of knowledge construction in history. 
But we can also find phenomenological ac-
counts of landscape outside philosophy. Take, for 
instance, anthropologist Tim Ingold’s Lines (2007), 
which considers the relationship between movement 
and inscription. Moving through and representing 
the land, whether verbally or graphically, involve 
proceeding along lines. Superficially, a meditation 
on lines may seem not about landscape. Ingold’s 
interest, however, is all sorts of movement across 
surfaces—something we find in both landscape and 
writing. What is significant in Ingold’s work is his 
ability to move across cultural boundaries to iden-
tify the ways in which narrative becomes inscribed 
on the land and the land becomes understandable as 
elements of narrative in a host of different ways. 
It is important to note that the move from de-
scriptive to hermeneutic phenomenology is in part 
the move from the search for the universal in ex-
perience to the recognition that all experience 
comes mediated through interpretive mechanisms—
in other words through the particular personal and 
cultural situations of individual and group. Husserl 
could write the Cartesian Meditations as a primer 
on phenomenology because he was following Des-
cartes’ lead of attempting to find a universally reli-
able method for knowledge. Heidegger, on the other 
hand, is resolutely anti-Cartesian. If we are to look 
for philosophical method that will not only allow us 
to analyze place but also be sensitive to the implica-
tions that place might have on the emergence and 
development of knowledge, we will find the 
Husserlian vs. Heideggerian explications dramati-
cally different in emphases and conclusions. 
Whatever its particular sense, there is a convic-
tion in all phenomenological efforts that philosophy 
must be about experience, though what it means to 
access that experience may vary with phenome-
nologist. In addition, what we do with experience 
once we describe or interpret it may also differ, 
though we are definitely not engaged in thinking 
about metaphysical abstractions, whether in regard 
to the land or to the self. Landscape is not land but 
experience of the land. A theoretical approach that 
appreciates that distinction is crucial. 
 
Language & Landscape: Questions 
We have, in short, two methodological poles and 
shades of difference between them that help one to 
understand the relationship between landscape and 
language. On one hand, we can trace the concept of 
landscape across disciplinary and cultural changes; 
with enough care we can tease out distinctions be-
tween landscape as a concept and other related con-
cepts like land, terrain, or place. On the other hand, 
we can ask about how we as human beings engage 
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the land to produce landscape—that is, how we ex-
perience the land. 
These contrasting approaches to landscape turn 
on how we treat subjectivity. Both approaches give 
us significant direction as to how we, on one hand,  
might understand landscape within our own specific 
lived situation; and how, on the other hand,  we 
might understand landscape across various discipli-
nary and cultural boundaries. To conclude, I present 
a set of six questions that might be helpful in think-
ing about what it means to move across these 
boundaries.  
 
 What is the purpose of asking about land-
scape? Are we asking about naming? About 
place? Are we getting some insight into a cul-
ture? Are we sharpening our geographical knowl-
edge? Are we finding ways of interpreting across 
boundaries? 
The question of purpose moves us beyond the 
idea that we are working with bare concepts that 
have no relation to social, political, religious, or 
disciplinary perspectives. For example, maps of Af-
rica were far more “filled in” in the interior of the 
continent before the 19th century than they were 
during the 19th century. Africa was not always the 
“dark continent” but became that label as particular 
kinds of questions about Africa became prevalent. 
In this case, geography contributed to the colo-
nial enterprise by confirming the prejudice that Af-
rica was an empty continent with no history and, 
therefore, ready for the taking. The African land-
scape became a way to avoid thinking about the 
people who lived there. 
For example, one can still find settlers in Kenya 
from before independence who, regarding the “real” 
Kenya as the place of birds and animals, speak of 
native Africans as a corrupting influence. Land-
scape becomes the rural idyll, not only confirming a 
Rousseauian view of nature but a Hegelian view 
that Africans are by nature uncivilized. 
If landscape is viewing land as something, that 
“as” need not be benign or positive. In this sense, 
asking why one inquires about landscape is a way to 
identify narrative implications. 
   
 What does it mean to understand the other 
spatially and platially? Does one understand 
the other through or with place? Or does one 
understand place by understanding the other? Do I 
infer something about the other by understanding 
their uses, namings, and practices of place, or do I 
gain insight on place by understanding those who 
inhabit it?  
Heidegger is useful here. He would ask us to 
see dwelling as a fundamental mode of being and to 
see building as making possible dwelling. In other 
words, we are never dealing with the purely natural 
because we always build, even if that building 
amounts to words about natural space designed to 
render it less foreign.  
One example is the idea of wilderness, a con-
cept used quite differently in different places, in part 
because of different relationships with the natural 
other. Naming and defining that natural other is al-
ways entwined with the human other and, thus, 
“wilderness” is something quite different in Europe 
than it is in the United States. In Europe, the mean-
ing arises from “wildness,” or the place where the 
wild person lives. In the United States, wilderness is 
the pristine—what is untouched by human hand.  
In short, if one is speak of dwelling, one must 
speak of it differently in different places. This is not 
geographical determinism, but the recognition that 
our places have a provenance—they are imagined 
using the understandings we have available. This 
perspective allows one to think about landscape 
across cultural boundaries. 
 
 In what languages does landscape speak? 
Landscape itself is a language that always em-
bodies a set of conventional signifiers. For 
example, Claude Lorrain’s paintings established a 
particular vocabulary of the land with terms like 
“picturesque” to refer to particular landforms. Trav-
elers on the Grand Tour carried a Claude glass (or 
“black mirror”) by which they could transform any 
landform they encountered into a version of a 
Claude painting, complete with frame and muted 
tinting. 
In short, landscape is always already language, 
though this in itself doesn’t tell us much. To what 











guages might it be? Does landscape speak in dia-
lects or entirely different languages? In other words, 
is there enough commonality in the conventional 
systems of understanding the land so that we can 
speak of a common meaning core, or does land-
scape function like languages, sufficiently different 
so that we are working with incommensurable 
meanings? 
      The appropriation of landscape in the sciences 
tends to turn it into a meta-term, applicable beyond 
the level of locally significant signifiers. We might 
recognize, therefore, that what counts as landscape 
in the United States might be vastly different in a 
Chinese context. On the other hand, we might also 
realize that there are sufficiently similar ways of 
making the land comprehensible so that we can 
speak at this meta-level in a meaningful way. 
 
 How is landscape as a concept being used? 
Focusing on use often allows us to tease out 
the different provenances within the ecology 
of similar concepts and assists in clarifying those 
concepts. On one hand, landscape may be used as 
the mirror of the processes of consciousness. In 
other words, landscape can inscribe differing forms 
of consciousness, and if we can locate differences 
among those inscriptions, we can learn about how 
consciousness operates and acts. In this mode of 
interpretation, we treat landscape as a text, perhaps 
more specifically as parole—the coherent utterances 
that bear meaning and are the immediately experi-
enced elements of meaning. 
On the other hand, we might understand land-
scape in terms of langue—the invariant structure 
that underlies the possibility of practice. Here, we 
can speak of a language of landscape that is richer 
or poorer. For example, we could imagine an ex-
tremely rudimentary language—a kind of proto-
language—that describes experience in broad cate-
gories that do not distinguish between kinds of re-
lated experiences. We could, in a contrasting way, 
imagine a language that has elaborate means for dis-
tinguishing related but different experiences. Hu-
man-made landscapes, in particular, can be seen as 
affording rich or poor grammar: Consider the con-
trast between strip mall and traditional marketplace. 
The former affords a limited vocabulary in that the 
proper form of engagement is primarily commer-
cial, while the latter is more rich in expression, 
since we can imagine other modes of engagement 
that include sociability, diversity, and serendipity. 
 
 How does landscape encode time? In her 
On Landscape, Susan Herrington (2009) ex-
plains that landscape exists along the axis of 
time, particularly in terms of memory, imagination, 
and anticipation. What kinds of memory does land-
scape encode? Does it preserve memory or repress 
it? Is there something like anamnesis possible with 
landscape—in other words, the “unforgetting” in 
which we can re-member and re-construct a coher-
ent past out of the traces that have been left in the 
land? 
Visually, there are many banal, and even bad, 
landscapes circulating in the popular media. We 
could mention the art historian’s favorite target, 
Thomas Kinkade, and his hyper-real, hyper-
romanticized landscapes that have proved so popu-
lar with many Americans. Kinkade was by no 
means the first—Constable’s pastoral scenes were 
practically wallpaper in nineteenth-century Eng-
land, a touchstone for the urban, industrialized 
Briton to recover the “meaning” of British life. 
What would banal landscapes look like in other 
cultures? Could we recognize them? We can some-
times see such banality in tourist art (Africa is full 
of images of the “Big Five” as if the savannah and 
the veldt were reducible to them). 
It is important to demystify the concept of 
landscape in other cultures so that it does not just 
stand in for older ideas about the exotic. If it is fun-
damental to any particular site of knowledge pro-
duction that place and, particularly, landscape be 
engaged, then we must also allow that this engage-
ment could be done superficially or stereotypically. 
Recognizing this allows one to consider what an 
adequate concept of landscape might be in some 
particular context. 
And what kind of anticipation might be avail-
able in the idea of landscape, both in our own disci-
pline and culture and in those of others? Does the 
landscape narrative rely on a progressive-regressive 
view of time and history? Or does that narrative ne-










more or less like the past? Or is there yet some 





 What is an aesthetics of landscape? The 
debt that landscape has to art means that dis-
ciplinary uses of the landscape concept have 
often borne echoes of its roots in aesthetics. The 
questions one asks about landscape are often about 
beauty or (given the distinctions among the sublime, 
the beautiful and the picturesque) about a particular 
kind of order. More often this order is not the stasis 
of form or proportion but the dynamism of motion, 
since one typically moves through or to landscapes. 
In other words, one typically participates in the aes-
thetic value of landscape. 
This direct involvement means that description 
of landscape elements alone does not fully capture 
the aesthetic provenance. How does one encompass 
the sense of participatory movement intimated by 
the concept of landscape when labeling and naming 
seems to calcify a dynamic understanding? One so-
lution is poetry, which can push language beyond its 
inherent tendency to freeze things with descriptions. 
Might poetry be a central means for evoking a par-
ticular concept of landscape? 
  
Doing Philosophy across Borders 
As I suggested at the start of this essay, one task of 
philosophy is to analyze concepts and to question 
the purpose and relevance of concepts for particular 
tasks. Arguably, philosophy’s major contribution to 
intellectual endeavor is the analysis of concepts and 
the creation of concepts when needed. Philosophers 
have typically worked at this contribution by start-
ing from an abstract position, draining out all par-
ticularity and emphasizing essential characteristics. 
In the case of landscape, this approach is in-
adequate. Abstracting from the lived sources of 
landscape concepts expunge their significance. The 
result is sterile and uninformative. Much of the 
time, philosophers have not been particularly good 
with particularity. Throughout Western history, phi-
losophical approaches have avoided particularity. 
For example Aristotle’s topos did not require atten-
tion to any particular place and did not differentiate 
between places. Neither did Locke’s examination of 
place. For our purposes here, both efforts fall short. 
If we are to be true to philosophy and true to 
landscape, we must recognize that we can never 
stop with categorizing or classifying. For philoso-
phy to operate adequately at the edges of cultures 
and disciplines, it must find ways to do more than 
just translate. Cultures are never static. Landscape, 
like language, is lost and renewed, appropriated in 
controversial and trivial ways. 
6 
The six questions I raise here offer instances of 
the methods I sketched at the start of this essay. 
There I raised both issues of provenance and phe-
nomenology. These questions indicate the kinds of 
concerns with which one must deal in any attempt 
to use landscape as a viable concept. I have argued 
that the concept of landscape is actually multiple 
concepts, rooted in different cultural and discipli-
nary spaces. As we move across those boundaries, 
we risk misunderstanding but also encounter a crea-
tive opening that is only available as we question 
the questions that produce the concepts we use.  
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Place & Space Website 
For both beginning and experienced researchers, 
Janz’s website, “Research on Place & Space,” is 
an exceptional resource for exploring topics cov-
ered in EAP. His aim is “to incorporate as many 
traditions and perspectives as possible” and “to 
cross-pollinate the notion of place across disci-
plines.” Website headings include: 
 
▪ What should I read first? 
▪ General websites; 
▪ Resources on place. 
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 suspect that if I asked you to imagine the 
home you occupied at age ten you would 
sit back, close your eyes, and traverse that 
space in your mind’s eye. So it is when I 
ask elderly residents of a local convalescent 
center to revisit, in their mind’s eye, the homes 
of their youth and early adulthood. 
Opha Miller, 100 years old, closes her eyes 
and describes the pasture seen from her back 
window as if it still exists. She sits on the 
porch and looks out across the road at the Wis-
nand girls. She recalls her husband, a good 
carpenter, building that porch, and revisits the 
bedroom in which she gave birth to a daughter. 
Moving further back through time, 93 
years, she describes how, at age seven, she 
lived with her family in Texas and helped fill 
bags with cotton and dump them into a canvas 
covered wagon. She is crossing a little bridge 
and hears a train whistle right up close. “I 
jumped off that bridge and the passenger train 
nearly hit me!” She never told her folks about 
that since she knew that would mean trouble. 
Through the irony of dementia she confesses 
once again, three minutes later, and reiterates 
the story just as before. 
Another resident nicknamed Hack shows 
me the photograph of his former home on the 
wall of his room at the center. The photo is one 
of those bird’s-eye pictures taken by itinerant 
pilots who would then hawk the images to the 
appropriate household. The structure is a small 
bungalow highlighted in front by a stone arch 
at the start of a sidewalk leading to the house. 
The arch has no adjoining fence and so does 
not keep things out but welcomes them in. 
Hack mentions how his son used to mow the grass 
across the road at Opha Miller’s house (yes, the very 
same Opha now living in the next room!). Hack, speak-
ing of his son while pointing to the arch in the picture, 
says: 
 
Hack: “He sees now what old Dad did. I did that.” 
Phil: “You did?” 
Hack: “A windstorm blew it down… My son said [to the insurance 
man], ‘There’s nobody gonna fix that unless they put it back 
exactly like Dad had it!’ This guy looked at it and said, ‘I’ll put 
it back exactly like that’... and he did.” 
 
Pointing to the stone work, Hack says: 
 
Hack: “I cut every one of them with a pitchin’ tool.” 
Phil: “You cut it with pitching tools...  You mean you dug them out 
of the ground?” 
Hack: “You face it.” 
Phil: “You call that ‘pitching it’?” 
Hack: “Yeah, ‘pitching it’ is making rock face out of it... and squarin’ 
it up—it’s a breakin’ tool [shows me the movement of the tool in 
a chopping motion with his hands]... something like a big wide 
chisel, but it’s cut on just like that—you get that just right and 
it’ll break the rock. But you line it with a square, and then cut it. 
Put your rock face on it.” 
 
s he talks about his life, I stand in awe, reminded 
of how I love the work that brings me here to lis-
ten. When Hack talks about doing some “water 
witchin’” as a kid and not finding a forked peach branch, 
he lets me know with his hands how he improvised with a 
“coke bottle and a number nine wire.” When he tells about 
the man from Texas who came up to drill wells, it seems 
important to remark that he used a number five casing, 
“not a number six like they use around here.” And when 
Hack drew his water from a rock spring out at his Greene 
County home, it was cold: “It was at least 51 degrees, and 











As he talks, his body enters into the con-
versation. The objects we use to construct our 
conversation, the pictures on the wall, help ce-
ment the relationship between us and place us 
in the imaginary landscape we are noting to-
gether. 
A conventional, semiotic understanding of 
the objects in Hack’s room might suggest that 
the stone arch represents Hack’s friendliness 
and hospitable nature. It might suggest that the 
arch represents Hack’s valued past, which it 
does. The stone arch is significant. It does have 
symbolic import—as a symbol of his artisan-
ship and a vehicle for a son’s pride of father. 
But the arch is more than that. It’s a pres-
ence in and of itself. As Hack stands there and 
“faces” those rocks with his hands, that arch is 
rebuilt, recreated anew, re-experienced not as 
symbol but as home itself. As Hack’s body en-
ters into this process of memory, the effect is 
transformational, in Barbara Myerhoff’s sense, 
in that the past enters into the present and 
transforms the institutional space of his room 
into the place of his experience [1]. 
Gaston Bachelard, in The Poetics of Space, 
describes this memory of the body: 
...the house we were born in is physically inscribed in us. It is 
a group of organic habits. After twenty years, in spite of all 
the other anonymous stairways, we would recapture the 
reflexes of the “first stairway,” we would not stumble on that 
rather high step. The house’s entire being would open up, 
faithful to our own being. We would push that door that 
creaks with the same gesture, we would find our way in the 
dark to the distant attic. The feel of the tiniest latch has 
remained in our hands [2]. 
 
Wendell Berry, Kentucky farmer, poet, and 
essayist describes this bodily attachment to 
place in his short novel, The Memory of Old 
Jack, in which elderly Kentucky farmer Jack 
Beechum no longer farms his old place. 
Though he lives in the boarding house in town, 
he dwells in the memories of place:  
[But] the present is small and the future perhaps still 
smaller. And what his mind is apt to do is leap out of 
that confinement, like an old dog, still strong, that has 
been penned up and then let loose in the one countryside 
that it knows and that it knew for a long time. But it is 
like an old dog possessed by an old man’s intelligent 
ghost that remembers all it has seen and done and all the places it 
has known, and that goes back to haunt and lurk in those places. 
Some days he can keep it very well in hand, just wandering and 
rummaging around in what he remembers. He is amazed at what he 
comes upon that he thought he had forgot… Sometimes he can re-
cover a whole day, with the work he did in it, and the places, and 
als and the people and even the words that belong to it [3]. the anim
o memory of home is not merely symbolic and repre-
sentational but draws upon one’s whole being as it is 
recollected. The proper study of it is not semiotic but 
phenomenological. As the original experience involves the 
whole body, is it any wonder that its memory should do the 
same? 
In ways that are compelling to me because they reso-
nate with my experience of place, Bachelard, Berry, Hack, 
and Opha point to the role that memory plays in converting 
empty space into place. Important objects are not mere 
souvenirs (though the root meaning of the word suggests a 
bodily “coming back again”). They take on meaning as 
they evoke narrative and recreate bodily experiences. 
Memory, it seems, is the hallmark of a good place. We 
might say that a good place remembers itself to us. More 
properly, we might say that a good place has a kind of mir-
ror quality because it helps us to remember ourselves to 
ourselves. Kathleen Woodward cites a passage from The 
Stone Angel, by Margaret Laurence, in which 90-year-old 
Hagar Shipley finds himself in his objects: 
 
My shreds and remnants of years are scattered through it [the 
house] visibly in lamps and vases...If I am not somehow contained 
in them and in this house, something of all change caught and fixed 
here, eternal enough for my purposes, then I do not know where I 
am to be found at all [4].  
 
A good place is a “keeping place.” It holds people to-
gether through their common participation in its qualities. 
As Wendell Berry put it in another essay, “a human com-
munity, then, if it is to last, must exert a kind of centripetal 
force, holding local soil and local memory in place” [5] . 
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